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False Light Invasion of Privacy:





In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis proposed
that a new branch of tort law be recognized to protect the "sa-
cred precincts of private and domestic life" from invasion by
"[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise .... 1
Seventy-seven years later, in Time, Inc. v. Hill,2 the United
States Supreme Court first decided a case involving an alleged
violation of the "right of privacy" by a medium of mass commu-
nication. Although Time, Inc. v. Hill was the result of instanta-
neous photographs and journalistic enterprise, it is doubtful
that Warren and Brandeis would have recognized the case as
falling within the conceptual parameters of the "right of the
individual to be let alone" which they had outlined.
3
The Hill suit was based on a magazine's misrepresentation of
a matter of public interest and concern -the experiences of a
family held hostage in their home by escaped convicts.4 De-
spite the fact that the Hill family attempted to avoid publicity,
the hostage incident, which was followed by a gun battle be-
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consin-Madison, 1970; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1981.
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1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REV. 193, 195 (1890).
2. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
3. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
4. 385 U. S. at 378. The Feb. 28, 1955 LtIfe magazine article and photo layout that
led to the Hill suit falsely stated that a novel, a Broadway play, and an upcoming film
were all based on the experiences of the Hill family. The photos, taken in the Hill
family's former home where the crime had occurred, inaccurately implied that the
family had been subjected to violence and abuse during the incident. IE at 376-78,
391-M.
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tween the convicts and police, became major news.5 An accu-
rate article about the incident could not have been deemed an
invasion of the family's right of privacy. But the falsity of the
actual publication led the New York courts to hold Time, Inc.
liable for invasion of privacy. The decision was ultimately re-
versed by the United States Supreme Court twelve years after
publication of the feature.7 In reversing, the Court held that a
plaintiff in a false light action resulting from the publication of
a matter of public interest can recover only upon a showing of
actual malice, that is, "that the defendant published the report
with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the
truth."'
A comparison of the Hill case with the Warren-Brandeis ap-
proach clearly illustrates "how the law has grown in channels
foreign to the original conceptual framework."9 Hill presents
an example of the third of four categories of invasion of pri-
vacy first recognized by Dean William Prosser ° and eventually
incorporated into the American Law Institute's Restatement of
the Law of Torts.1 This category is generally referred to as
"false light" and consists of giving "publicity to a matter con-
cerning another which places the other before the public in a
false light."' 2 Writing in 1970, Professor Don R. Pember noted:
"While it is difficult to see what this kind of publication has in
common with the traditional concept of invasion of privacy, this
hybrid version of the tort nevertheless has grown to be an ac-
tive area of the law."'"
False light invasion of privacy continues to be an active but
extremely troublesome area of the law, surrounded by unset-
tled issues and unanswered questions. 4 The most fundamental
5. D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE
FnsT AMENDMENT 210-12 (1972).
6. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
7. Hill v. Hayes, 207 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1960), qff'd, 18 A.D.2d 485 (1963), off'd., 15
N.Y.2d 986 (1965), rev'd sub nom. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
8. 385 U.S. at 388.
9. D. PEMBER, supra note 5, at 244.
10. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALn. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 652A-E (1981) [hereinafter SEcOND RE-
STATEMENT]. Section 652A identifies the four categories and succeeding sections dis-
cuss them in detail: intrusion, 652B; appropriation, 652C; public disclosure of private
facts, 652D; and false light, 652E.
12. Id. § 652E. See also Prosser, supra note 10, at 398-401.
13. D. PEMBER, supra note 5, at 243.
14. See, e.g., Ashdown, Media Reporting and Privacy Claims-Decline in Consti-
tutional Protection for the Press, 66 Ky. L.J. 759 (1977-1978); Emerson, The Right qf
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problem is determining the proper conceptual definition of
false light invasion of privacy. Central to sorting out that issue
is a determination of what relationship, if any, exists between
false light and defamation, and between false light and public
disclosure of private facts, another of Prosser's four categories
of invasion of privacy.'5 Perhaps the most vivid, and troubling,
empirical manifestation of the conceptual confusion is judicial
and scholarly uncertainty over when the actual malice standard
should be applied in false light actions.' The question, in es-
sence, is whether applicability of the actual malice rule in false
light actions should be dependent upon the public status of the
plaintiff or upon whether the offending report deals with a
matter of legitimate public interest. Confusion over application
of the actual malice requirement, though, is merely sympto-
matic of the deeper and more critical confusion over the very
nature of the false light tort and the personal interests it is
designed to protect.
This article addresses both the symptom and the underlying
malady. The central thesis is that the law of privacy was
created to protect interests significantly different from those
protected by the law of defamation. Therefore, the law of defa-
mation should not be used to inform the law of false light. In-
stead, analogies should be drawn between false light and the
related privacy tort of disclosure. Use of the actual malice rule
should be governed by analysis of the conceptual definition of
false light and its relationship to the law of privacy in general,
rather than by resort to surface similarities between false light
and defamation.
This article begins by briefly reviewing the history of the ac-
tual malice rule as applied in defamation and false light actions.
Privacy and Freedom qf the Press, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329 (1979); Hill, Defa-
mation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 CoLUM L. REV. 1205 (1976);
Note, False Light Invasion Qf Privacy? 15 TuLSA L.J. 113 (1979).
15. Prosser, supra note 10, at 392-98. See also SECOND RESTATEmENT, supra note
11, § 652D.
16. See, ag., Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1091, rehig denied, 744
F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Intl,
Ltd., 525 F. Supp. 585, 602 (D. Md. 1981), revd in part, 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982);
Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (D.D.C. 1981); Rinsley v.
Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 854 (D. Kan. 1977); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville
Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 888 (1981), cert. denied, 456 US. 975 (1982); Davis v. High
Society Magazine, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 374, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 316 (1982), cert denied, 456
U.S. 975 (1982); SECOND RESTATEMENT, 8upra note 11, at § 652E caveat and comment
d; Ashdown, supra note 14, at 781; HIll, supra note 14, at 1274.
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Next, it discusses scholarly commentary addressing the concep-
tual definition of false light and the relationships between false
light and defamation and disclosure of private facts. The article
then surveys cases decided by state and federal courts during
the past decade to illustrate how lower courts have coped in-
consistently with the uncertain application of the actual malice
rule and with the overall conceptualization of false light. Fi-
nally, the authors suggest the appropriate conceptualization of
false light and the standard to be used in determining when
actual malice is constitutionally required in false light actions.
I
Uncertainty Created
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,7 the United States
Supreme Court first applied the actual malice rule, holding
that the United States Constitution requires elected public offi-
cials to prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth to prevail in libel actions "against critics of their official
conduct."'" Three years later, the Court extended the actual
malice rule to defamation actions brought by public figures. 9
In 1967, the Supreme Court also heard Time, Inc. v. Hill,20 its
first false light invasion of privacy case. The primary task of
the Court in Hill was to determine the standard of fault to ap-
ply in such invasion of privacy cases. The Court adopted the
actual malice standard, deciding that a plaintiff in an invasion
of privacy action involving "false reports of matters of public
interest" could not recover absent a showing "that the defend-
ant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth."'1 Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Brennan stated:
We create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensa-
ble service of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press
with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts
associated in news articles with a person's name, picture or
portrait, particularly as related to non-defamatory matter.
2
2
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. Id. at 283.
19. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
20. 385 U.S. 374.
21. Id. at 388. Although the Court provided no definition of "matters of public
interest," it noted, 'We have no doubt that the subject of the Life article, the opening
of a new play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest." Id.
22. Id. at 389.
[Vol. 9:347
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In what appeared to be the logical extension of Hill, in 1971 a
plurality of the Supreme Court applied the actual malice re-
quirement to defamation cases involving reports of general or
public interest.2 Three years later, however, a five-member
majority of the Court explicitly rejected that expanded stan-
dard. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,24 the Court established a
defamation standard that focused on the status of the plaintiff.
The Court held the actual malice standard applicable only to
public officials and public figures.2 The Court declared that
private defamation plaintiffs need only prove negligence.2
However, the Court did not indicate whether, by repudiating
the matter-of-public-interest standard in defamation actions, it
intended similarly to repudiate this standard with respect to
privacy actions.
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,2 handed down six
23. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
24. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
25. Id. at 342-43. The Court has defined public officials as "at the very least...
those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the pub-
lic to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental
affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). The Court has identified two types
of public figures: all-purpose public figures., persons who "occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes;"
and limited public figures, individuals who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
26. Id. at 347-48. In two recent defamation cases, the United States Supreme
Court applied a matter-of-public-concern standard, but not as a basis for determining
the level of fault required for plaintiffs to prevail. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), the Court held that a private plaintiff in a
defamation case resulting from "speech involving no matters of public concern" could
collect punitive and presumed damages absent a showing of actual malice. Id. at 761.
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986), the Court held that
a private-figure plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity if the allegedly defama.
tory speech involved a matter of "public concern." Id. at 1559. In Hepps, Justice
O'Connor wrote that, taken together, Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet established "two
forces that may reshape the common-law landscape to conform to the First Amend.
ment. The first is whether the plaintiff is a public official or figure, or is instead a
private figure. The second is whether the speech at issue is of public concern." Id. at
1563. It is important to note that in Dun & Bradstreet and Hepps, the Court used the
term public concern, not public interest. In Hepps, the Court said that the allegedly
defamatory article concerned "the legitimacy of the political process, and therefore
clearly 'matters of public concern."' Id. at 1565. Assuming the choice of language was
purposeful, it appears that the Court was restricting its holding to speech on topics
that not only interest the general public, but also bear some relationship to the com-
mon welfare. Furthermore, in both Dun & Bradatreet and Heppa, the Court reaf-
firmed. the Gertz public figure/private figure distinction as the basis for determining
the level of fault required for plaintiffs to prevail in defamation cases.
27. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
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months after Gertz, did little to clarify the matter. Cantrell
was a false light case involving a story in the Cleveland Plain
Dealer that implied that a conversation took place between a
reporter and Margaret Cantrell, the widow of a man killed in a
bridge disaster. Mrs. Cantrell, however, had not been at home
at the time of the reporter's visit to her house, and had not spo-
ken with the reporter.2 The Supreme Court acknowledged the
matter-of-public-interest standard established in Hill and de-
termined that the trial judge in Cantrell, unlike the trial judge
in Hill, had properly instructed the jury "that liability could be
imposed only" upon a finding of knowing or reckless falsifica-
tion, that is, actual malice.2 Because knowledge of falsity was
present in Cantrell, the Supreme Court saw no need to address
the broader question of when actual malice might not be neces-
sary in false light actions. The Court explicitly reserved the
question of whether the Hill standard survived Gertz, stating.
(Tihis case presents no occasion to consider whether a State
may constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of liability
for a publisher or broadcaster of false statements injurious to a
private individual under a false-light theory of invasion of pri-
vacy, or whether the constitutional standard announced in
Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to all false light cases.30
In the year following Cantrell, the Supreme Court heard its
first case involving public disclosure of private facts. In Cox
Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn,"1 the father of a teenage girl who
died as a result of a rape sued for invasion of privacy after a
television station broadcast the girl's name. The Georgia
Supreme Court rejected the station's first amendment defense,
ruling that a state statute making it a misdemeanor to broad-
cast the name of a rape victim indicated that, in Georgia, a rape
victim's name was not a matter of public concern.32
In a cautiously worded opinion, the United States Supreme
Court reversed. Although the case presented the Court with
the opportunity to constitutionalize the matter-of-public-inter-
est defense to disclosure actions,' Justice White, writing for
28. Id. at 247-48.
29. Id. at 249-50.
30. Id. at 250-51 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 323 (1974)).
31. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
32. 231 Ga. 60, 66; 200 S.E.2d 127, 134 (1973).
33. 420 U.S. 469 (1974).
34. As defined by the Restatement, disclosure consists of giving "publicity to a
matter concerning the private life of another... if the matter publicized is of a kind
[Vol. 9:347
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the majority, chose a much narrower basis for reversal. The
Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments prohib-
ited the states from "impos[ing] sanctions on the publication of
truthful information contained in official court records open to
public inspection. ' Rather than declaring the report constitu-
tionally protected because it dealt with a matter of legitimate
public interest, the Court appeared to be saying that the rape
victim's name was not a private fact at all because it had been
placed "in the public domain on official court records."'3s Sup-
porting this conclusion was the Court's quotation of the Re-
statement of the Law of Torts: "There is no liability when the
defendant merely gives further publicity to information about
the plaintiff which is already public. Thus there is no liability
for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiff's life which are
matters of public record... .,"'T In Cox, the Court also reiter-
ated its holding in Time, Inc. v. Hill that actual malice was re-
quired for a plaintiff to prevail in a false light action resulting
from the publication of a matter of public interest. The Court
went on to say that "whether truthful publication of very pri-
vate matters unrelated to public affairs could be constitution-
ally proscribed" remained an unanswered question.s In a
footnote in a concurring opinion, Justice Powell declared that
the Court's opinion in Gertz "call[ed] into question"40 the con-
tinued applicability of the Hill matter-of-public-interest stan-
dard. He concluded, however, that the Court had not yet been




Much of the literature on false light in the last three decades
has addressed the relationships between false light and defama-
that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (b) is not of legitimate
concern to the public." SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 652D. The "not of
legitimate concern to the public" provision is generally referred to as the newsworthi-
ness defense.
35. 420 U.S. at 495.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 494 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS (Tent Draft No. 13, Apr.
27, 1967) § 652D comment C).
38. 420 U.S. at 490.
39. Id. at 491.




tion, and false light and disclosure of private facts.' Those re-
lationships are central to the question of the applicability of the
actual malice requirement. If false light and defamation are
indistinguishable or, at the very least, closely related torts
designed to protect the same individual interest, then using the
same standard for determining applicability of the actual mal-
ice requirement in both makes sense. If false light and defama-
tion are unrelated, or only tangentially related, and protect
distinct personal interests, then a case can be made for differ-
ent applications of the actual malice requirement.
Furthermore, if false light and disclosure are essentially sim-
ilar torts protecting similar interests, then use of the public-
interest standard in false light cases is justifiable. Liability for
disclosure of private facts requires that the "matter publicized
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."'
False light also requires proof of offensiveness, but does not
carry the absolute privilege for the reporting of newsworthy
material that disclosure does.44 The reason, of course, is that
disclosure involves true information; false light involves
falsehoods.
Additionally, if the law of false light and the law of disclosure
protect similar personal interests, the justifications that sup-
port the newsworthiness defense to disclosure warrant use of
the same standard for false light, that is a fault requirement
based on a public interest standard. The newsworthiness de-
fense in disclosure recognizes that the individual's interest in
shielding his or her life from public scrutiny must bow before
the public's interest in having access to information of legiti-
mate public concern in an open society.
Assuming the false light tort protects the same individual in-
terest, the presence of a non-calculated or non-reckless false-
42. See Ashdown, supra note 14; Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Presa" A Contempo-
rary Conflict in Values, 20 N.Y.L.F. 453 (1975); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Emerson,
supra note 14; Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 326 (1966); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to
Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CA.
LIF. L. REV. 935 (1968); Pember & Teeter, Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 50 WASH. L. REv. 57 (1974); Prosser, supra note 10; Wade, Defamation and the
Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962).
43. SECOND R&5TATEMENT, supra note 11, § 652D.
44. Id. § 652E.
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hood ought not affect the balance between the individual
interest and the public interest in access to information on mat-
ters of public concern. As the Supreme Court stated in Hill, "In
this context [matters of legitimate public concern], sanctions
against either innocent or negligent misstatement would pres-
ent a grave hazard of discouraging the press from exercising
the constitutional guarantees. Those guarantees are not for the
benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us."45
The Restatement of the Law of Torts recognizes, clearly and
with great influence, the uncertainty that exists regarding the
relationship between defamation and false light and the appli-
cability of the actual malice requirement. A Restatement com-
ment on the relationship between defamation and false light
notes that a publication placing someone in an "objectionable
false light or false position" often will also be defamatory.46 "In
such a case the action for invasion of privacy will afford an al-
ternative or additional remedy, and the plaintiff can proceed
upon either theory, or-both, although he can have but one re-
covery for a single instance of publicity. '47 In a later section,
the Restatement acknowledges uncertainty over "the extent to
which common law and statutory restrictions and limitations
that have grown up around the action for defamation are
equally applicable when the action is one for invasion of pri-
vacy by publicity given to falsehoods concerning the
plaintiff. '
The perceived similarity between defamation and false light
underlies the Restatement's approach to the constitutional re-
quirement of actual malice as well. The Restatement lists two
requirements for a false light claim. First, the false light in
45. 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
46. SEcoND RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 652E comment b.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 652E comment e. Second Restatement lists such restrictions as including
the requirement that plaintiff plead and prove special damages when the words are
not defamatory per se and limitations imposed by retraction statutes and statutes re-
quiring the filing of a bond for costs. Second Restatement does not refer to the appli-
cability of statutes of limitations, but that issue has been raised by a number of lower
courts. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. Second Restatement declares that
"it is arguable" such restrictions "should not be successfully evaded by proceeding
upon a different theory of later origin, in the development of which the attention of
the courts has not been directed to the limitations." The comment notes the lack of
authority on the issue and concludes that decisions must be based on the particulars of
the restriction and the case. "[N]o generalization can be made." Id. See also Douglass
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1985).
1987]
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which plaintiff was placed must be "highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person," and second, defendant must have "had knowl-
edge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would
be placed."49 The second requirement seems to indicate that
actual malice is required in all false light actions. A caveat,
however, is attached to the definition of false light:
The Institute takes no position as to whether there are any cir-
cumstances under which recovery can be obtained under this
Section if the actor did not know of or act with reckless disre-
gard as to the falsity of the matter publicized and to the false
light in which the other would be placed but was negligent in
regard to these matters. °
The caveat is explained in a comment, which summarizes the
history of the actual malice requirement from New York Times
through Cantrell. According to the comment, "[t]he full extent
of the authority [of Hill ] ... is presently in some doubt.... The
effect of the Gertz decision upon the holding in Time, Inc. v.
Hill has thus been left in a state of uncertainty."'5' The conclu-
sion underscores the presumption that defamation and false
light are intimately related by suggesting that the justification
for maintaining the Hill matter-of-public-interest standard is
that "the injury is not so serious when the statement is not de-
famatory."52 The implication is that the defamation and false
light torts protect the same personal interest, but that false
light results in a somewhat lesser degree of harm to that in-
terest.
Writing four years before the Supreme Court had even ar-
ticulated the actual malice requirement in New York Times, a
leading scholar on tort law, Dean William Prosser, contended
that the false light tort protected the same personal interest as
defamation. "The interest protected is clearly that of reputa-
tion, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defama-
tion."53 In fact, Prosser suggested that the false light category
of privacy might be "capable of swallowing up and engulfing
the whole law of public defamation."" Prosser also saw "a re-
semblance to disclosure; but the two differ in that one involves
49. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 652E.
50. Id. § 652E caveat.
51. Id. § 652E comment d.
52. Id.
53. Prosser, supra note 10, at 400.
54. Id. at 401.
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truth and the other lies, one private or secret facts and the
other invention. Both require publicity."' 5
In the privacy section of his Handbook on the Law of Torts,
published in 1971 and based substantially on his earlier article,
Prosser reiterated the notion that false light may or may not be
defamatory. However, the important question, he argued, is
whether the published material would be objectionable to a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, the same offensive-
ness criterion used in disclosure actionsM
Several scholars have expanded on the link Prosser per-
ceived between defamation and false light. Dean John Wade of
Vanderbilt Law School, for example, suggested a strong enough
relationship among defamation, disclosure and false light to
justify the merger of all three into a single tort-intentional
infliction of mental suffering.57 Professor Edward J. Bloustein
agreed with Prosser that false light actions involve reputation,
but took issue with Prosser's categorization of privacy invasion
as four distinct torts.m Bloustein contended the law of privacy
should be used to explain defamation law, not vice versa. Ac-
cording to Bloustein, defamation and all forms of invasion of
privacy involve essentially the same personal interest, protec-
tion of "individual personality and dignity.
'5 9
Other commentators have rejected the theory that defama-
tion and false light invasion of privacy violate the same per-
sonal interest. While the law of defamation exists to protect
reputation, Professor Melville Nimmer asserted: "The right of
privacy protects not reputation, but the interest in maintaining
the privacy of certain facts."'  Professor Francis X. Beytagh
described false light as frequently being "mistakenly regarded
as the stepchild ... of defamation, despite the very different
interests that the concepts deal with and the disparate interests
they seek to protect."' The 1984 edition of Prosser and Keeton
on the Law of Torts still acknowledges that defamation and
false light actions often will result from the same publication,
but goes on to declare: "The action for defamation and the ac-
55. Id. at 400.
56. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 813 (4th ed. 1971).
57. Wade, supra note 42, at 1124-25. See also Pember & Teeter, supra note 42, at
90-91.
58. Bloustein, supra note 42, at 971-72.
59. Id. at 991.
60. Nimmer, upra note 42, at 958.
61. Beytagh, supra note 42, at 459. See also Kalven, upra note 42, at 341.
1987]
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tion for invasion of privacy should be carefully distinguished.
The former is to protect a person's interest in a good reputa-
tion.... The latter is to protect a person's interest in being let
alone. .... "62
Nimmer," Beytagh, 4 Kalven,6 and others," though, in re-
jecting a link between defamation and false light, have urged
recognition of the relationship between false light and disclo-
sure of private facts. According to Nimmer, false light is simply
the logical and necessary extension of the disclosure tort. "The
injury to the plaintiff's peace of mind which results from the
public disclosure of private facts may be just as real where that
which is disclosed is not true."6 7 Kalven contends that the
plaintiff in a privacy action should not be required "to prove
the truth of the assertion to state a cause of action" nor should
the plaintiff "be allowed to bolster a claim for privacy on the
ground that a statement is false."6 A statement that invades
an individual's privacy causes the same injury whether it is true
or false.6 9
While authors have tended to disagree over whether false
light invasion of privacy should be viewed as akin to defama-
tion or disclosure, scholars writing after Gertz have agreed that
Gertz apparently superseded Hill.70 None, however, has ex-
pressed that view with certainty. Alfred Hill, for example, con-
cluded that "it is likely that the Court will now apply to the
false light cases the refinements evolved in Gertz,"'" and Ger-
ald Ashdown suggested that the Court was moving "away from
the concept of public interest and back to the character of the
party" in defamation and privacy cases.72
. In sum, legal scholars have argued that the false light tort is
substantially similar to both defamation and disclosure. The
62. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs 864 (5th ed. 1984). Since
Prosser died in 1972, alterations in the latest edition of the handbook presumably re-
flect editor W. Page Keeton's views.
63. Nimmer, supra note 42, at 963-64.
64. Beytagh, supra note 42, at 502-03.
65. Kalven, supra note 42, at 340-41.
66. E.g., Ashdown, supra note 14, at 781-82; Emerson, supra note 14, at 345.
67. Nimmer, supra note 42, at 963.
68. Kalven, supra note 42, at 340-41.
69. I&
70. See, e.g., Ashdown, supra note 14, at 781; Beytagh, supra note 42, at 474, 482;
Hill, supra note 14, at 1274.
71. Hill, supra note 14, at 1274.
72. Ashdown, supra note 14, at 781.
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crucial question in determining when a plaintiff should be re-
quired to prove actual malice, however, is whether the false
light tort protects an interest similar to that protected by the
law of defamation, that is, reputation, or an interest protected




In the seven years between the Supreme Court's decisions in
Time, Inc. v. Hil 7 3 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,7 lower
courts apparently have had little difficulty in determining
when the actual malice standard should be applied in false light
invasion of privacy actions. Citing Hill, courts routinely fo-
cused on the nature of the issue discussed in the report to ascer-
tain whether it was a matter of public interest.75 The Supreme
Court's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.'6
in 1971, declaring the actual malice requirement applicable in
defamation actions resulting from reports on matters of public
concern, provided additional support for application of the Hill
rule.77
After Gertz and Cantrell in 1974, however, the situation
changed. With no clear guidance from the Supreme Court and
admissions of uncertainty from the experts in tort law, lower
courts began debating when to apply the actual malice rule in
false light litigation. As the following survey shows, some
courts have continued to follow Hill, focusing on the subject
matter of the report. Other courts have used the distinction
between public and private figures applied in Gertz, focusing on
the status of the plaintiff. In some cases, the court's choice of
standard is so unclear that it is impossible to determine
whether Hill or Gertz is being used as the basis for decision.
73. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
74. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
75. See, e.g., Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968);
Kent v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 349 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Cordell v. Detective
Publications, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd 419 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.
1969).
76. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
77. See, e.g., Kent v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 349 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (Rosen-




A. Opinions Utilizing the Matter-of-Public-Interest Standard
One of the clearest judicial statements that the Hill approach
to false light litigation survived Gertz came from the Arkansas
Supreme Court in 1979. In Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat,78 the
court held that a lawyer, suspended from practice because of
unethical conduct, was not a public figure and, therefore, had to
prove only negligence in his defamation claim.79 However, the
Arkansas Democrat's erroneous report that Dodrill had failed
the bar exam when his suspension was up dealt with a matter
of public concern, and, therefore, Dodrill needed to prove ac-
tual malice to sustain his false light claim against the paper.
The court stated:
Where the plaintiff is not a public figure and the publication is
of matters of general or public concern, the rule laid down in
Time, Inc. v. Hill ... dictates that a plaintiff must prove actual
malice and that decision remains the law with respect to inva-
sion of privacy actions. Later decisions of the Supreme Court
which have retreated from the malice standard in private indi-
vidual defamation actions have not eroded the rule of Time,
Inc. v. Hill... as to "false light" privacy actions.80
In a footnote, the court said that the U.S. Supreme Court
"consciously abstained from examining the status" of Hill in its
decision in Cantrell."' "It is the duty of this court to follow the
mandate of... Hill until the rule announced therein has been
modified or overruled." 2
In 1981, the Kentucky Supreme Court also concluded that
Hill remained applicable in false light actions, but indicated it
would be receptive to a fault standard focusing on the status of
the plaintiff." In the first sentence of its opinion in McCall v.
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., the court declared
that this was a case involving defamation and invasion of pri-
78. 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980).
79. Id. at 636-37; 590 S.W.2d at 844.
80. Id. at 639; 590 S.W.2d at 845.
81. Id. at 639 n.9; 590 S.W.2d at 845 n.9.
82. Id. at 639 n.9; 590 S.W.2d at 845, n.9. See also Machleder v. Diaz, 618 F. Supp.
1367, 1373-74 n.4, (S.D.N.Y. 1985), qff'd in part and rev'd in part, 801 F.2d 46 (1986);
Fellows v. National Enquirer, 165 Cal. App.3d 512, 211 Cal. Rptr. 809, 824 (2d Dist.
1985), review granted, 215 Cal. Rptr. 853, 701 P.2d 1171 (1985); Goodrich v. Waterbury
Republican-American, 188 Conn. 107,130 n.22, 448 A.2d 1317,1330 n.22; Dean v. Guard
Publishing Co., 73 Or.App. 656, 660 n.4, 699 P.2d 1158, 1160 (1985).
83. McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Ky.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982).
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vacy claims by a "private" citizen." However, the court went
on to say that the Louisville Times article "dealt with a matter
of public interest, viz., possible bribery of a judge or 'fixing a
case.' ,,)5 The court acknowledged that Hill required proof of
actual malice in cases involving reports on matters of public in-
terest even when "the injured party was a private individual. ''se
The court stated:
Whether Gertz will be used to modify Time v. Hill is only spec-
ulation. Until the Supreme Court has spoken, we must comply
with the ruling in Hill, and recovery is predicated on the stan-
dards set out therein. In the event the Gertz rule is applied, we
believe the desirable standard of fault is that of simple negli-
gence which we have adopted in this opinion for libel cases.8 7
In Cohn v. NBC," the New York Supreme Court ultimately
applied the Hill matter-of-public-interest standard after a leng-
thy and confusing discussion of when actual malice is required
in New York false light cases.8 9 On appeal, the appellate divi-
84. Id. at 883.
85. Id. at 885.
86. Id. at 888.
87. Id.
88. 3 MEDIA L REP. (BNA) 1999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 22, 1978), modified, 67
A.D.2d 140, 414 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1979), qff'd, 50 N.Y.2d 885,408 N.E.2d 672, 430 N.Y.S.2d
265, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1022 (1980).
89. 3 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2003-05. Perhaps the court's discussion can be
viewed as simply an accurate reflection of the lengthy and confusing history of false
light in New York. The state's privacy law, an amendment to the New York Civil
Rights Law, addresses only the use of an individual's name or likeness for trade or
advertising purposes without consent. N.Y. CIrv. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney
Supp. 1987). New York courts, however, "have broadly construed what constitutes
commercial misappropriation of a person's name or picture under the statutes." Davis
v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 374, 379, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (1982). The
"purposes of trade" language has been interpreted to include those uses "afflicted
with substantial falsification." Id. at 381,457 N.Y.S.2d at 314. Indeed, the Hill case was
an action under New York law. A New York high court ruling handed down a few
months after Hill, though, has caused some confusion over whether focus should be
placed on the subject matter of the report or the status of the plaintiff in cases based
on fictionalization. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286
N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), resulted from an admittedly fictionalized biography of baseball
star Warren Spahn. Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Hill, the New York courts
held that the biography violated the New York statute. 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543,
274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966). The publisher appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
and in May 1967, four months after Hill, the Court vacated the New York ruling and
remanded the case for consideration in light of the Hill ruling. 387 U.S. 239 (1967).
The New York Court of Appeals once again found in favor of Spabn, a result not
surprising since actual malice was evident in the publisher's admission that the biog-
raphy was purposely fictionalized to appeal to a juvenile audience. The problem, how-
ever, is that the New York high court focused on Spahn's status as a public figure in
discussing the need for proof of actual malice. 21 N.Y.2d at 126, 223 N.E.2d at 842, 286
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sion declared plaintiffs public figures for the purpose of their
defamation action.90 On the invasion of privacy claim, the ap-
pellate court affirmed summary judgment for NBC, declaring:
"Mhe subject matter of the film remains a matter of public
interest. In the absence of allegation and proof that the adver-
tising was false and published with knowledge of its falsity or
disregard of the truth, ... no actionable cause is stated...
under the circumstances of this case." 91
While several courts have noted the uncertainty over the im-
portance of the plaintiff's status in false light actions, others
have applied the matter-of-public-interest standard without
comment. For example, in Uhl v. CBS, Inc.,92 the plaintiff was
characterized as "a private individual who traveled a few miles
from his home to go hunting for a day. He sought no public
office, he injected himself into no controversy, he did not seek
to have his picture taken although he knew of the presence of a
camera crew." 93 Yet, Clare Randall Uhl ended up on nation-
wide television in CBS's documentary on hunting, The Guns of
Autumn, and he sued for false light invasion of privacy. De-
spite Uhl's private status, a federal district court held that
proof of knowing or reckless falsehood was necessary to sustain
his false light claim. Citing Hill, the court stated: "We will ac-
cept the premise that the rule of New York Times v. Sullivan
... applies to this case, under the extension of that rule to mat-
ters of public concern, which include news, information, educa-
tion and entertainment,... and that invasion of privacy claims
must also face the constitutional standard."
In cases in which plaintiffs were public figures or officials,
N.Y.S.2d at 834. While the court cited Hill for the actual malice definition, it never
explicitly addressed whether the Spahn biography qualified as a matter of public in-
terest. While it is not unreasonable to read Spahn as assuming that a biography of a
sports hero was as much a matter of public interest as a play inspired by a real crime,
the "public figure" language of Spahn remains as precedent for courts applying New
York law. The Cohn v. NBC court's discussion of this background concludes with
what appears to be an attempt at reconciling Hill and Spahn. In a footnote, the court
noted that while under Hill "the emphasis... is on the event, it is plain that a public
official has a lesser expectancy of privacy than a purely private individual." 3 MEDIA
L. REP. (BNA) at 2005, n.7. Why the court used "public official" rather than "public
figure" is unclear. Perhaps the explanation is that the plaintiffs were former aides to
a U.S. senator.
90. 67 A.D.2d at 153, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
91. Id. at 142, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
92. 476 F. Supp. 1134 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
93. Id. at 1140.
94. Id. at 1139. A jury had awarded Uhl $1 in nominal damages, and the trial judge
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some courts also have clearly focused on the subject matter of
the report, rather than the status of the plaintiff. In Roberts v.
Dover," which involved both defamation and false light claims,
the court ruled that Mike Dover, a Tennessee highway patrol
officer, was a public official. In addressing Dover's false light
claim, the court noted that Hill required "application of the
New York Times standard where the published materials con-
cerned matters of public interest." The court then went on to
declare that allegations of misconduct leveled at a public offi-
cial qualified as matters of public interest,9 thus requiring
proof of actual malice to sustain the false light claimY7
In Ali v. Playgirl,"s resulting from publication of a picture
depicting "a nude black man seated in the corner of a boxing
ring," accompanied by verse referring to the figure as "the
Greatest,"° the court noted that "the offensive illustration and
rhyme are essentially fictional, do not purport to portray news-
worthy information and therefore do not embody those factual
'matters of public interest' for which the Supreme Court ex-
pressed concern in Time, Inc. v. Hill.'':°°
Despite the uncertainty about the relationship between Hill
and Gertz reflected in the Restatement of Torts, scholarly com-
mentary and the judicial decisions discussed below, several
courts, both state and federal, have continued properly to apply
the matter-of-public-interest standard in false light cases. This
had denied punitive damages on the ground that Pennsylvania required proof of com-
mon law malice to support punitive damages.
See also Street v. NBC, 512 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), aff'd, 645 F.2d 1227 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815 (1981), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981), in
which the trial court declared plaintiff was not a public figure for purposes of her
defamation claim and, therefore, had to prove only negligence, but, in addressing her
invasion of privacy claim, held that actual malice was necessary under Hill and Can-
trell. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit ruled that Mrs. Street was a public figure for the
defamation action but did not address the false light action. See also Adreani v. Han-
sen, 80 111. App.3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679, 683 (1980); Mechner v. Dow Jones, 4 MEDIA L.
REP. (BNA) 1239, 1240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 2,1978), aff'd. 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
1787 (N.Y. App. Div. June 16, 1980), leave to appeal denied, 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
1483 (N.Y. May 7, 1981).
95. 525 F. Supp. 987, 990-91 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
96. I at 995 n.9.
97. Id. See also Alim v. Superior Court, 13 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1528, 1532 (Cal.
Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1986); Medeiros v. Northeast Publishing, 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 1982); Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Comm'n of Musca-
tine, 304 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1981).
98. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
99. Id. at 725, 727.
100. Id. at 728, n.9.
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standard has been followed in cases involving both public and
private persons; however, in only one case, Ali v. Playgirl, did
the court fail to find the subject matter of the publication a
matter of legitimate public concern.
In focusing on the subject matter of the reports, these courts
have recognized that the law of invasion of privacy is designed
to protect individuals from unwarranted intrusions upon their
private lives. Regardless of whether individuals are private
persons like attorney Louis Dodrill, public officials like officer
Mike Dover, or public figures like boxer Muhammad Ali, they
have an interest in protecting their private lives from public
scrutiny. But once an individual, public or private, becomes en-
meshed in a matter* of legitimate public interest and concern,
the public's interest in a free flow of information becomes
paramount. As Justice Brennan wrote in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia:'
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved, or because in some sense the individual did not "vol-
untarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary in-
terest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the
participant and the content, effect, and significance of the con-
duct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.10
In Gertz, the Supreme Court rejected that approach for defa-
mation actions, but the Court has not retreated from the mat-
ter-of-public-interest standard in false light cases, as the
Arkansas and Kentucky Supreme Courts and others have
noted. Thus, the courts that have focused on the subject matter
of the report not only have recognized the proper conceptual-
ization of false light invasion of privacy, but also have followed
the constitutional mandate set forth by the Supreme Court in
Hill.
B. Opinions Focusing on the Status of the Plaintiff
Some courts that have chosen to focus on the status of the
plaintiff have explained their choice of standards by question-
ing the continued vitality of Hill. In addition, several courts
have emphasized similarities between defamation and false
light actions as a justification for applying the Gertz approach.
101. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
102. Id at 43.
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For example, in Nelson v. Globe International, Inc.," the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York applied a "gross irresponsibility" standard, the so-called
gross-departure-from-journalistic-standards test, in a false light
action involving a private individual who was the subject of a
newsworthy article because of "the similarity between these
defamation and privacy act claims."'' 4 The gross-depature-
from-journalistic-standards test applied by the court in Nelson
is the same standard used in New York in private-figure defa-
mation cases involving matters of legitimate public concern.105
The court chose to apply that fault standard after blatantly
misstating the current status of the case law: "Not surprisingly,
no court, state or federal, has applied the actual malice stan-
dard in this context [false light] to a plaintiff who was neither a
public official nor a public figure"'0-clearly an inaccurate
conclusion and statement of the law in the light of such cases as
Dodrill, McCall, and Uhl, discussed in the preceding section.10°
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas
also treated defamation and false light as virtually synonymous
torts in Rinsley v. Brandt.108 Plaintiff there charged defendant
with both defamation and invasion of privacy, but the court
found the defamation claim barred by the statute of limita-
tions.'es The court, however, said the plaintiff was both a public
official and a public figure "who would have to prove actual
malice on the part of defendants" to recover in his privacy ac-
tion, which was not time-barred 10 "Generally speaking, it may
be said that the standards which govern recovery in a defama-
tion action also govern in a false light privacy action .... 'T]he
courts have consistently treated false light privacy in essen-
tially the same way they have treated defamation.' """ The
103. 626 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
104. Id. at 981. See also Fils-Aime v. Enlightenment Press, Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 947
(N.Y. App. Term. 1986).
105. See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341
N.E.2d 569, 571 (1975).
106. 626 F. Supp. at 980.
107. Uhl v. CBS, 476 F. Supp. 1134 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat,
265 Ark. 223, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times
Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981). See also Machleder v. Diaz, 618 F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Adreani v. Hansen, 80 111. App.3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1980).
108. 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1222 (D. Kan. Feb. 22, 1980), qffId, 700 F.2d 1304 (10th
Cir. 1981).
109. 446 F. Supp. 850, 853 (D. Kan. 1977).
110. 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 122.
111. Id. at 1224 (quoting 446 F.Supp. at 854).
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court cited several law review articles for the premise, but no
cases. The key issue in Rinsley, though, was whether defend-
ant's book contained any "false statement of fact.""2 After de-
claring summary judgment for defendant was appropriate
because of lack of falsity, the court went on to gratuitously dis-
cuss the fault requirement applicable in false light cases. The
court concluded that "the Gertz emphasis on status analysis
should be extended to overrule the Hill emphasis on public in-
terest."113 Plaintiff's failure to prove actual malice provided an-
other justification for summary judgment." 4
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also explicitly adopted
the view that the Hill matter-of-public-interest standard is no
longer applicable. In Wood v. Hustler,115 a false light action
brought by a private-person plaintiff, the court, after a lengthy
review of United States Supreme Court defamation and privacy
cases and analysis of Texas law, declared that Gertz "under-
mines the authority of Hill.""' 6
In Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co.,"17 the district court used the
similarity between defamation and false light to justify focus-
ing on the status of the plaintiff. Dresbach alleged false light,
disclosure of private facts, and defamation in his suit against
the author and publisher of a book about the 1961 murders of
his parents by his brother. For purposes of the disclosure
claim, the court found that the subject matter of the book "can-
not be said to be without legitimate public interest" and thus
did not constitute unlawful disclosure."'
Turning to the false light claim, however, the court declared
that since plaintiff was not a public figure, he need prove only
negligence, that is, that the passages "were written without the
exercise of ordinary care to determine their accuracy.""' 9 Ac-
112. Id. (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 1233.
114. Id. at 1235. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit focused on the question of falsity. In
concluding, however, the appellate court seemed to indicate its agreement with the
public/private figure standard: "Because we agree with the district court that the
statements Rinsley objects to on appeal are not actionable, we do not decide whether
Rinsley is a public figure or public official or whether the district court erred in find-
ing that the defendants acted without malice." 700 F.2d at 1310.
115. 736 F.2d 1084 (1984), rehg denied, 744 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469
U.S. 1107 (1985).
116. Id. at 1091. See also Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984).
117. 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981).




cording to the court, the United States Supreme Court in Gertz
and Cantrell "characterized as an open question whether the
actual malice standard need apply in all false light cases."' 12 In
explaining its decision to use a negligence standard in the false
light claim, the court referred to Phillips v. Evening Star News-
paper Co. 1 and said that the District of Columbia applies a
negligence standard in private person defamation actions.
"[N]o reason appears to distinguish false light invasion of pri-
vacy from defamation actions in this regard."m But in its dis-
cussion of Dresbach's disclosure claim, the court provided an
excellent reason for distinguishing between invasion of privacy
and defamation actions-claims of privacy must bow to open
discussion of matters of public interest in our society.
Clearly, this society has put a higher value on open criminal
proceedings and on public discussion of all issues than on an
individual's right to prvacy. To guard against the possible
evils of abuse of power if the criminal justice system were to
operate away from the public eye, and of suppression of free-
dom of thought if writers could not freely explore the causes
and handling of past crimes of public interest, the plaintiff's
right to bury the past must be sacrificed. Freedom of speech
would be crippled if discussions of matters of public interest
were narrowly circumscribed in the manner suggested by
plaintiff to protect privacy,.
2'
The court's failure, however, to recognize the appropriate
conceptualization of false light caused it to lose sight of the fact
that invasion of privacy, not falsity, is the heart of a false light
claim as well; the same societal interests in open discussion that
must restrict disclosure claims also govern false light actions.
Plaintiff's privacy claims, both disclosure and false light, were
based on allegations that the book "expose[d] private informa-
tion about him which is offensive and objectionable to reason-
able persons of ordinary sensibilities."12'
The gist of the libel claim was that the book identified plain-
tiff "as a co-conspirator and accessory before and after the fact
in the murder of his parents."''  The libel claim rested on
passages that plaintiff alleged indicated that he knew of his
120. Id. at 1288.
121. 424 A.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
122. 518 F. Supp. at 1288.
123. Id. at 1291 (emphasis added).




brother's intent to murder their parents, did nothing to prevent
the murder of his mother, and told his brother to "shoot him
(the father) again."'"
In contrast, both the disclosure and false light claims rested
on passages that related to plaintiff's childhood and life after
the murders, the limited number of visits he made to his
brother in jail, his failure to provide financial assistance to his
brother and similar statements. The only difference among the
alleged privacy-invading statements was that plaintiff disputed
the accuracy of some of them.'m In granting summary judg-
ment for defendants on the disclosure claim, the court ex-
pressed compassion for Dresbach and sympathized with his
desire to protect his privacy, but nonetheless said that permit-
ting the disclosure claim to stand would be inconsistent with
the first amendment.12s Since Dresbach's false light and disclo-
sure claims were premised on the same types of statements and
the same type of injury, the same concern for protecting discus-
sion of matters of public interest should have governed both.
He should have been required to prove actual malice to sustain
his false light action.
While in the cases discussed above the courts explained their
reliance on Gertz rather than Hill, the Sixth Circuit in Bichler
v. Union Bank and Trust Co.12' treated a false light claim as if
it were a defamation claim, with no explanation. The court did
not cite Hill, Cantrell, or any other false light cases. Instead, it
relied almost exclusively on Gertz and other defamation
cases.'30 After stating that "[t]he First Amendment has been
read to impose limits upon state laws dealing with libel, slander
and other privacy-related issues, "131 the court found that plain-
tiff was neither a total nor limited public figure and, therefore,
was not required under the Constitution to prove actual malice.
The court's treatment of the false light claim is especially re-
126. Id. at 1293.
127. Id. at 1288-89.
128. Id. at 1291.
129. 715 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), vacated 718 F.2d 802, 745 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir.
1984) (en banc). The court, en banc, vacated the panel decision on the basis of Mlchi-
gan's qualified privilege, which imposes an actual malice requirement on reports on
matters of public interest.
130. The only privacy cases discussed in the opinion were Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527
F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), and Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), both
disclosure of private facts cases. Cox was used to support plaintiff's disclosure claim,
but Virgil was used as part of the discussion of who qualifies as a limited public figure.
131. 715 F.2d at 1063 (emphasis added).
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markable in light of the fact that plaintiff's defamation claim
was held to be barred by Michigan's statute of limitations.ls 2
Essentially, the court allowed plaintiff to bring his defamation
action through the back door in the guise of false light.
In four other cases, three arising under New York law and
one under Illinois common law, the courts focused on the status
of the plaintiffs, all of whom were public figures. In Hotchner
v. Castillo-Puche,'s the Second Circuit declared plaintiff a pub-
lic figure for purposes of his defamation action and stated, "The
same standard applies if the public figure sues for invasion of
privacy."'
1 4
In Meeropol v. Nizer,135 the sons of Julius and Ethel Rosen-
berg charged that Nizer's book, The Implosion Conspiracy, de-
famed them and placed them in a false light. After noting that
the trial court had held the book dealt with "matters properly
within the orbit of public interest and scrutiny," the Second
Circuit focused on the public character of the plaintiffs.1w The
court said that the actual malice rule applied "since we are
dealing with public figures.""'
Sinatra v. Wilson '3s involved an unauthorized biography of
singer Frank Sinatra. The district court said that New York
law allows a public figure to recover for "an unauthorized ver-
sion of his life 'if the presentation is infected with material and
substantial falsification and the work was published with
knowledge of such falsification or with reckless disregard for
the truth.' "13
Finally, in Douglass v. Hustler Magazine,"4° actress and
model Robyn Douglass sued Hustler over the publication of
nude photographs of her, some of which had already been pub-
lished in Playboy.141 The court said that there was "some ques-
132. Id. at 1062. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
133. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
134. Id. at 913.
135. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
136. Id at 1066.
137. Id.
138. 2 MEDIA L REP. (BNA) 2008 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1977).
139. Id. at 2010 (quoting Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834). See
the discussion of New York privacy law, supra note 89.
140. 769 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1985).
141. Id The falsity aspect of Douglass' claim rested to a large extent on her con-
tention that the photo layout implied she had consented to its publication and "that
voluntary association with Hustler as a nude model is degrading." She also contended
that the photos implied she was a lesbian. Id. at 1135. Douglass was not the first per-
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tion" as to whether private plaintiffs in false light cases were
relieved from having to prove actual malice, as they would be
in defamation cases. 142 The court here, however, emphasized
the status of the plaintiff, perhaps because she claimed "that
she was excused from having to prove actual malice because
she is not a public figure."'43 The court found Douglass' claim
ridiculous: "[N]ot only is Robyn Douglass no shrinking violet;
she is a budding celebrity eager to be seen in the nude by mil-
lions of people."'" Public figure Robyn Douglass had to prove
actual malice in her false light action.
While focusing on the status of the plaintiff, rather than the
subject matter of the report, works to the disadvantage of the
media in most false light cases,145 the Douglass case demon-
strates the possibility that application of the Gertz rule in false
light suits sometimes may disadvantage the public-figure plain-
tiff. Douglass is not the best vehicle for illustrating this since
Douglass had already voluntarily appeared in the nude in Play-
boy, and, at least arguably, an actress and model's appearance
unclad is a matter of public interest.'1 But another all-purpose
public figure, say, the First Lady of the United States, might
reasonably argue that the unauthorized publication of nude
photographs of her in Hustler would not constitute a matter of
public interest. Nonetheless, under the approach taken by the
Douglass court, such a public figure would have to prove actual
malice.
While a few of the courts that chose to apply a public/private
figure test in false light cases did not bother to explain that
choice, most of the courts in this category used Gertz and a pre-
son to voluntarily appear unclothed in one mass medium and then complain that the
same or similar photos in another medium constituted false light invasion of privacy
because of the vulgar and offensive nature of the second publication. See Faloona v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985), off'd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th
Cir. 1986); Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
142. 769 F.2d at 1141.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984); Braun
v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984); Bichler v. Union Bank and Trust Co., 715 F.2d
1059 (6th Cir. 1983), tacated, 718 F.2d 802, 745 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1984) (en bane);
Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981); Sinatra v. Wilson,
.2 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2008 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1977).
146. See, e.g., Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (partially nude photos of an actress "who has occupied the fantasies of
many moviegoers over the years" are newsworthy).
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sumed relationship between defamation and false light as a jus-
tification. This facile approach, focusing on the superficial
similarity between defamation and false light (both involve fal-
sity), presents a real danger to unfettered discussion of public
issues. The Dresbach court itself, after falling into the trap of
equating defamation and false light, provided an articulate jus-
tification for distinguishing between the two: "Clearly this so-
ciety has put a higher value on... public discussion of all issues
than on an individual's right to privacy.1 47 But the Dresbach
court, like others discussed in this subsection, read invasion of
privacy out of the false light tort and failed to recognize that its
comments relative to the disclosure form of invasion of privacy
should apply with equal strength to false light.
Trends in false light cases are impossible to identify. There
does not appear to be any discernible set of factors which ex-
plain why in one case a court uses the matter-of-public-interest
standard and in another the emphasis is on the status of the
plaintiff. The only general conclusion that can be extracted
from the cases discussed above is that courts which apply the
Gertz rule in deciding when to require actual malice fail to rec-
ognize the proper conceptual definition of false light and the
privacy interests the tort is designed to protect.
A disturbing side issue arose in three cases in which the
courts focused on the plaintiff's status in applying the actual
malice standard. In Rinsley, Wood, and Bicher, the statutes of
limitations on libel actions in plaintiffs' respective states had
run by the time the actions were filed. However, the statutes of
limitations applicable to privacy actions differed, and, there-
fore, the false light claims of the plaintiffs were not time-
barred. 48 Assuming that the statutes of limitations on defama-
tion suits are designed to serve important private and societal
interests, allowing plaintiffs to slide their libel claims in
through the back door, under the guise of false light, would ap-
pear to undermine those interests. 49 Indeed, if applying the
Gertz rule rests on the theory that defamation and invasion of
147. 518 F. Supp. at 1291.
148. Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1087, (5th Cir. 1984); Bichler v.
Union Bank and Trust Co., 715 F.2d 1059, 1062 (6th Cir. 1983); Rinsley v. Brandt, 6
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1222,1223 (D. Kan. Feb. 22,1980), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir.
1981).
149. A number of states have held that the statutes of limitations applying to defa-
mation actions. also apply to false light actions. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Time, Inc., 7
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1981,1984 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 1981), and cases cited therein.
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privacy are similar claims, applying different statutes of limita-
tions seems to make little sense.
C. Opinions in Which the Standard Is Unclear
The frequency of confused or confusing discussion of the
fault standard in false light cases in the past decade is alarming.
Roughly one-third of the approximately forty opinions re-
viewed for this study were unclear as to what standard should
be or was being applied in determining whether a showing of
actual malice was required for the plaintiff to prevail. In some
cases the confusion occurred in dicta when the courts addressed
issues which were not essential to the decisions.
In both Johnson v. Lexington Herald-Leader 50 and McCor-
mack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co.,15l plaintiffs' false light
claims failed on the ground of lack of falsity. Nonetheless, in
both cases the courts touched on the fault standard. In neither
opinion was it clear which standard the court would apply if
such a determination were necessary.1 52 Two other cases,
Matheson v. Bangor Publishing Co.'" and Jumez v. ABC
Records, 15 briefly referred to actual malice as required, but did
not discuss why. Matheson involved a seemingly private plain-
tiff, while Jumez involved a classical guitarist who would ap-
pear to be a public figure.155
In two other cases, Fitzgerald v. Penthouse International"
and Davis v. High Society Magazine,157 the courts acknowl-
150. 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1365 (Ky. Feb. 4, 1983).
151. 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980).
152. In Johnson the court at first said it assumed "simple negligence" would apply
to the case. Later in the opinion the court referred to the lack of "even a facial ap-
pearance of... reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter." 9 MEDIA
L. REP. (BNA) at 1336. In McCormack the court engaged in a general discussion of the
right of privacy, but throughout it is unclear which specific types of invasion of pri-
vacy are being discussed. 613 P.2d at 740-42. See also Faloona v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341, 1358 n.54 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (publication does not convey a false
meaning, but a footnote discusses both public figures and newsworthy events).
153. 414 A.2d 1203 (Me. 1980).
154. 3 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2324 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 1978).
155. In Matheson, the issue was whether a journalist-defendant in a false light case
could be forced to reveal a confidential source. A superior court justice had declared
that the identity of the source was "crucial" to plaintiff's burden of proving actual
malice. 414 A.2d at 1204. In Jumez the court simply cited New York Times and de-
clared there was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding of actual malice. 3 ME-
DIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2327.
156. 525 F. Supp. 585 (D. Md. 1981), rev'd in part, 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982).
157. 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 90 A.D.2d 374 (1982).
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edged the confusion in the false light area but declared that
since plaintiffs were limited public figures, actual malice was
required."5 8 Since the existence of a public controversy, a mat-
ter of public concern, is a critical element in defining a limited
public figure,' these cases might be viewed as attempts to
cover both bases. Plaintiffs were public figures because they
had involved themselves in public issues and, therefore, the
matters reported were of legitimate public interest and
concern.160
In the remainder of the unclear cases, the confusion seemed
to stem from judicial indecision and a resulting effort to cover
all the bases. Also evident was uncertainty over the relation-
ship between false light and disclosure of private facts. 161
As these cases show, uncertainty and confusion remain in the
area of false light. Some courts have simply applied the actual
malice standard, without explaining their reasons for doing so.
Others have engaged in lengthy and convoluted explanations,
which have provided little more guidance than the flat declara-
tions. Plaintiffs who turn to the courts to remedy perceived in-
vasions of privacy and defendants who seek the protection of
the first amendment deserve better.
IV
Toward an End to Uncertainty
In 1984, Gillmor and Barron predicted that the Gertz focus on
the status of the plaintiff would eventually prevail in false light
cases "in the interest of legal symmetry."'1 2 But that prediction
158. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, 525 F. Supp. at 603; Davis v. High Society Maga-
zine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d at 316, 90 A.D.2d at 384. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the
Supreme Court had defined a limited public figure as one who "voluntarily injects
himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public
figure for a limited range of issues.... [S]uch persons assume special prominence in
the resolution of public questions." 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
159. See also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
160. See also Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1978), in
which plaintiff was deemed a limited public figure for purposes of his defamation
action. In discussing Logan's false light claim the court simply cited Hill and Cantrell
and declared that plaintiff must prove actual malice. Id. at 1334.
161. See Cantrell v. ABC, 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. 111. 1981); Faucheaux v. Magazine
Management Co., 5 MEDIA L. RP. (BNA) 1697 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1979); Rafferty v.
Hartford Courant, 36 Conn. Supp. 239, 416 A.2d 1215 (1980); Crump v. Beckley News-
papers, 320 S.E. 2d 70 (W. Va. 1983).
162. D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MAS COMMUNICATION LAw 322 (4th ed. 1984).
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presupposes the existence of some rational and principled basis
for seeking symmetry between two distinct areas of law, defa-
mation and privacy. This article argues that the search for
symmetry should focus, instead, on the two related torts of
false light and disclosure of private facts, both of which protect
the same individual interest.
The comments of some courts and scholars notwithstanding,
the law of defamation and the law of privacy were rightly de-
veloped to serve significantly different personal interests. The
law of defamation is designed to protect an individual's reputa-
tion. Reputation is defined as "the estimation in which a
person, thing, or action is held by others."'16 Definitions of def-
amation invariably focus on the effects of a particular commu-
nication on the victim's relations with others.164 Thus, the focus
of defamation is the individual's public persona, the manner in
which friends, colleagues, and acquaintances perceive him or
her. The harm resulting from defamation consists of a public
misperception of one's character. It is the falsehood itself that
constitutes the wrong, for if the damaging statement were true,
no cause of action would exist. Under the theory of New York
Times v. Sullivan and its progeny, public people voluntarily
subject their reputations to public scrutiny. Therefore, those
who discuss their public personae--their reputations--are enti-
tled to greater protection under the first amendment. They are
liable for defamation only when actual malice underlies the
false statements made about a public person.
On the other hand, privacy refers to the right to maintain a
private persona and protect it from public scrutiny. According
to Judge Cooley, privacy is "the right to be let alone,"'16 and
according to Justices Warren and Brandeis, the right to be free
from invasion of "the sacred precincts of private and domestic
life." ' " The harm resulting from an invasion of privacy con-
sists of "the mental distress from having been exposed to public
view,"' 67 from the public being given the opportunity to per-
ceive those aspects of one's character or life that one prefers to
keep from public perception. As Professor Nimmer put it,
163. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1537 (unabr.
2d ed. 1980)(emphasis added).
164. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 62, at 773-78.
165. T.M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1879).
166. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
167. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 385.
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"The injury is to a man's interest in maintaining a haven from
society's searching eye."'' 6 Falsehood is not at the heart of the
injury, but it is the publication of the information itself,
whether true or false, that causes the injury.
Notwithstanding the protection given to the right of the indi-
vidual to be free from public perception, the law recognizes
that at times the privacy right must yield to the public interest
in open communication. Thus, the disclosure of private facts is
actionable only when the disclosure would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person and does not deal with a matter of legiti-
mate public interest.
As Professor Nimmer explains, false light should be viewed
as simply a derivative of the disclosure tort, protecting the
same individual interest:
Once the false light cases are understood as a logical, even a
necessary, extension of the private facts cases, the fallacy of
equating the false light cases to defamation actions becomes
apparent. The injury to the plaintiff's peace of mind which re-
sults from the public disclosure of private facts may be just as
real where that which is disclosed is not true. It would be ab-
surd to hold that the publication of an intimate fact creates lia-
bility, but that the defendant is immunized from liability
(though the injury to plaintiff's peace of mind is no less) if the
intimate "fact" publicly disclosed turns out not to be true, thus
putting a premium on falsehood. The sensibilities of the young
lady whose nude photo is published would be no less offended
if it turned out that her face were super-imposed upon some-
one else's nude body. The resulting humiliation would have
nothing to do with truth or falsity.1
9
Professor Keeton, however, distinguishes false light from
disclosure:
Recovery for an invasion of privacy on the ground that the
plaintiff was depicted in a false light makes sense only when
the accoun if true, would not have been actionable as an inva-
sion of privacy. In other words, the outrageous character of
the publicity comes about in part by virtue of the fact that
some part of the matter reported was false and deliberately
so.170
Professor Keeton supports this conclusion by noting that
168. Nimmer, supra note 42, at 958. See also id. at 959 and sources cited therein.
169. Id. at 963.




"[m]ost people [would be] offended by fictionalized accounts of
events in which they were involved as involuntary or even vol-
untary participants.
1 7 1
The emphasized portion of the above quotation is illogical.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical case. A mag-
azine article on the sexual habits of middle-class America de-
tails the sex life of an obscure married couple, who did not
consent to such a publication. The couple is fully identified,
and the account of their marital relationship is accurate, based,
say, on the report of an unscrupulous marriage counselor.
Under the Restatement's definition of disclosure, it would ap-
pear that the couple has a good chance of proving publication of
private facts.172 But, under Professor Keeton's conceptualiza-
tion of false light, if the information in the article were false,
the couple would not have an invasion of privacy claim! Ac-
cording to Keeton's definition, if the account were true, it
would be actionable as a private facts invasion of privacy, yet
its falsity would indemnify the publisher. If the article
presented what might be considered a "normal" sexual rela-
tionship, the publication also would be arguably nondefama-
tory, leaving the identified and presumably highly distressed
couple with no recourse under either defamation or privacy
law.
The problem with Keeton's definition is that, while it focuses
on two elements, falsity and offensiveness, it ignores the heart
of the wrong-that it is a privacy-invading communication.
Keeton's false light definition is akin to a libel definition
stressing the falsity and fault elements but ignoring the need
for defamatory content. Keeton seems to be suggesting a tort
designed to compensate people for the irritation they may ex-
perience as the result of being identified in a non-defamatory,
non-privacy-invading, but untrue, communication. Such a tort
might go far in stemming what used to be termed the licen-
171. Id. at 865.
172. While the sexual habits of middle America may be a matter of public interest,
it is at least arguable that the identity of an individual couple is not. See, e.g., Vas-
siliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 588-90 (D.C. 1985) (while plastic surgery is a
matter of legitimate public interest, photographs of a particular plastic surgery sub-
ject are not); Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So.2d 471,474, (Miss. 1976)
(invasion of privacy to name four mentally retarded children in an article on special
education in a local school); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295




tiousness of the press,1 73 but it hardly comports with our
twentieth century conception of what constitutes freedom of
expression: "[Tihe indispensable democratic freedoms secured
by the First Amendment" occupy a "preferred place" in our hi-
erarchy of rights and interests.' To suggest that an individ-
ual's interest in being protected from irritation could outweigh
such a preferred freedom ignores decades of development of
first amendment law and theory. Keeton's conceptualization of
false light places much emphasis on the offensiveness of fiction-
alized accounts. But aside from the area of broadcasting, and
there only in regard to profanity and indecency,x75 offensive-
ness alone has not been deemed sufficient to overcome first
amendment rights. Thousands have been offended by sexually
explicit films and publications, public gatherings of the Ku
Klux Klan and Neo-Nazi groups, sexist representations of wo-
men in the media, and public use of indecent and profane lan-
guage. Yet the offensiveness of such communications has not
been deemed sufficient to override the speakers' first amend-
ment rights.17
While Keeton contends that it is the falsity of the statement
that constitutes the wrong, Nimmer recognizes that privacy in-
vasion is the heart of the offense: "If the untrue statements in a
false light case are not as to matters which if true would be
private, then the interest in privacy is by hypothesis nonexis-
tent and therefore cannot counterbalance any opposing inter-
est in free speech."''1 7 In other words, the initial and most
fundamental question is whether the communication is pri-
vacy-invading, just as the most fundamental question in a libel
action is whether the words are susceptible of defamatory
meaning. If the communication is deemed privacy-invading,
the next inquiries involve falsity and offensiveness. While Kee-
173. See, e.g., Bradford, Sentiments on the Liberty of the Press, THE AMERICAN
WEEKLY MERCURY, Apr. 25, 1734, reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER
TO JEFFERSON 38-43 (L. Levy ed. 1966). See also generally L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A
FREE PRESS (1985).
174. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944).
175. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978),
reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
176. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), qff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172, rehg denied, 106 U.S. 1664
(1986); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill.2d 605,373 N.E.2d 21
(1978).
177. Nimmer, supra note 42, at 964.
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ton overstates the case by implying that offensiveness inevita-
bly flows from falsity,17 in some instances falsity alone may
generate the offensiveness.
The recent string of cases resulting from unauthorized publi-
cation of photos in Hustler magazine illustrates this point.17 9 In
those cases, plaintiffs contended that falsity consisted of the im-
plication that they had voluntarily agreed to have their photos
appear in Hustler. Offensiveness likewise consisted of the im-
plication of voluntary association with a magazine described as
"tasteless... offensive.., raunchy.., filled with smut and
sleaze and slime,.., devoted primarily to sexual exploitation
and disparagement of women." 80 Had the women consented to
publication of their photos, they could not have claimed inva-
sion of privacy via disclosure. A reasonable person would not
consider the authorized publication of a photograph offensive
to the one who had authorized its publication. Consent would
destroy both falsity and offensiveness.'18  Regardless of
whether the falsity and offensiveness elements are related in a
particular case, however, the sine qua non of false light, as well
as disclosure, is the presence of privacy-invading information.
In disclosure cases, newsworthiness is the accepted de-
fense." 2 Nimmer suggests that newsworthiness should provide
an absolute defense in false light cases as well, on the theory
that if the matter reported is one of public concern, there are
no privacy interests to be protected.8 3 While Nimmer's ap-
proach is undoubtedly the most desirable from a first amend-
ment perspective, it is also unlikely to be adopted by the
Supreme Court.' 4 The reasonable alternative is to acknowl-
178. See the hypothetical case of the couple named in an article on the sexual hab-
its of middle-class America, supra text accompanying note 172. Offensiveness there
exists independent of truth or falsity.
179. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1489 (1986); Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984);
Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985). See also Braun
v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984); Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498
F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Davis v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.3d 308,90
A.D.2d 374 (1982).
180. Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
183. Nimmer, supra note 42, at 964.
184. In light of the Supreme Court's repeated rejection of first amendment protec-
tion for knowing or reckless falsehoods, see, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967), and rejection of a matter-of-public-interest standard in defamation actions,
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edge the Court's declaration that the Constitution provides no
protection for "calculated falsehood, '' 1s5 and, therefore, to apply
the actual malice rule in invasion of privacy actions based on
false statements that, if true, would be absolutely privileged as
newsworthy. In sum, it is the Hill matter-of-public-interest
standard that coincides with the appropriate conceptualization
of false light as an offshoot or derivative of the disclosure tort.
The matter-of-public-interest standard in both disclosure and
false light cases provides the desired legal symmetry referred
to by Gilimor and Barron.
What of false light actions resulting from reports that do not
address matters of public interest? A number of courts have
suggested that a negligence standard should be applied in such
cases.lM That standard makes sense and squares with the con-
cept that freedom of expression is too important a right to al-
low liability without fault. 8 7 A negligence standard in such
false light cases, however, once again raises the issue of legal
symmetry. False light and disclosure are parallel torts. If two
reports, one false and one true, invade an individual's privacy
and neither report addresses a matter of public interest, what
reason is there to impose the burden of proving negligence on
the plaintiff in the false light case if the plaintiff in the disclo-
sure action bears no such burden? To impose a negligence re-
quirement in false light but not in disclosure actions would
provide greater protection for false statements than for true
statements!
The answer, of course, is that there is no place for a strict
liability standard in disclosure actions either. For a publication
to be actionable as disclosure it must be "highly offensive to a
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), it is extremely doubtful that the
Court would grant absolute protection to knowing or reckless falsehoods that consti-
tute invasions of privacy.
185. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
186. See, e.g., Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1984);
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse, 525 F. Supp. 585, 602 (D.Md. 1981), rev'd in part, 691 F.2d 666
(4th Cir. 1982); Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (D.D.C.
1981); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Ky.
1981).
187. Our discussions recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a pub-
lisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may
lead to intolerable self-censorship. Allowing the media to avoid liability only
by proving the truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate pro-
tection to First Amendment liberties.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
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reasonable person.' ' s' A negligence standard is part of the very
definition of disclosure since the tort requires unreasonable
conduct." 9 Negligence is defined as "[t]he omission to do some-
thing which a reasonable [person], guided by ordinary consider-
ations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do or the
doing of something which a reasonable and prudent [person]
would not do."'19 The concept of reasonableness is central to
both the legal definition of negligence and the definition of dis-
closure. A reasonable person would recognize the offensive-
ness of a privacy-invading communication, and, therefore, a
reasonable and prudent person would not publish it. Similarly,
the false light tort, incorporating the same reasonable person
language, already contains a negligence requirement with re-
gard to the offensiveness of the publication. 9' All that remains
to be done is to extend that negligence requirement to the fal-
sity issue in false light actions that do not involve reports on
matters of public interest.'92
The above discussion is based upon the principle that false
light actions must be limited to nondefamatory, but clearly pri-
vacy-invading, falsehoods. The law of defamation is adequate to
protect the individual's interest in reputation. There is simply
no need, nor is it constitutionally sound, to allow the law of
privacy to provide additional protection for reputational inter-
ests. As the Kentucky Court of Appeals noted:
In this overall first amendment controversy, what previously
could not be achieved through the tort law of libel and slander
because of the requirement of proving malice is now being
"backdoored" through the tort of [false light] invasion of pri-




The most obvious conclusion of this study is that the area of
188. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 652D (emphasis added).
189. Id.
190. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)(emphasis added).
191. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 652D.
192. Of course, this would require a dual showing of negligence, first with regard to
the offensiveness of the publication and second with regard to falsity. However, this
is inevitable since falsity is an additional element of the offense, not present in disclo-
sure cases.
193. Johnson v. Lexington Herald-Leader, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1365, 1367 (Ky.
Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1983).
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false light invasion of privacy is in a state of disarray. The
Supreme Court's failure to address head-on, in Cantrell v. For-
est City Publishing Co.,'4 whether the Hill matter-of-public-
interest standard in false light actions survived the Gertz rejec-
tion of that standard in defamation cases has resulted in disor-
der and confusion in the law. Some courts have continued to
follow Hill. Others have inferred that Gertz overruled Hill and
thus have adopted a standard focusing on the status of the
plaintiff. Still other courts have produced muddled opinions,
providing little guidance to either litigants or observers.
The solution to this confusion is obvious and has been recog-
nized by a number of courts. The Supreme Court announced
the standard to be used in false light cases in Time, Inc. v.
Hill,195 and reiterated that standard in both Cantrell v. Forest
City Publishing Co.'9 and Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn.'9 As
the Kentucky Supreme Court said, the United States Supreme
Court "has spoken""' and, unless or until the Court modifies
its holding in Hill, the first amendment requires that plaintiffs
in false light actions prove actual malice when the offending
report deals with a matter of public interest.
In 1984, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to recog-
nize the tort of false light invasion of privacy.' 9 The court de-
clared false light actions "inherently constitutionally suspect
claims for relief."'  The words of the North Carolina court are
worth heeding:
Two basic concerns argue against recognition of a separate tort
of false light invasion of privacy. First, any right to recover for
a false light invasion of privacy will often either duplicate an
existing right of recovery for libel or slander or involve a good
deal of overlapping with such rights. Second, the recognition
of a separate tort of false light invasion of privacy, to the ex-
tent it would allow recovery beyond that permitted in actions
for libel and slander, would tend to add to the tension already
existing between the first amendment and the law of torts in
cases of this nature.201
194. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
195. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
196. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
197. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
198. McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Ky.
1981).
199. Renwick v. News & Observer, 310 N.C. 312, 326, 312 S.E.2d 405, 413 (1984).
200. Id., 312 S.E.2d at 413.
201. ML at 323, 312 S.E.2d at 412. See also Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., 12
1987]
COMM/ENT L. J.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's rejection of the false
light tort was based on what the current state of affairs is,
rather than what it ought to be, in the area of false light: dis-
tortion of the conceptual definition of the tort by courts across
the country and widespread confusion over the elements and
requirements of the wrong. Courts must recognize the distinc-
tion between a right to reputation and a right to privacy, and
restrict plaintiffs to the appropriate theory of recovery. They
must recognize false light as a logical extension of the disclo-
sure tort, aimed at protecting the private persona from public
scrutiny. They must reject the dangerous notion that personal
vexation or irritation is adequate to overcome first amendment
rights. By utilizing the Hill matter-of-public-interest standard
to determine when proof of actual malice is required in false
light cases, courts will uphold the first amendment principle
that the individual's right to be let alone must bow to the pub-
lic's right to receive an unfettered flow of information on mat-
ters of public concern and interest.
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1303 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1985)(rejecting the false light tort in
Missouri).
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